During our field trip to visit the Dick Dowling statue I realized that I knew nothing about this war hero, but now after reading through the digital archives I have a much better understanding and appreciation for Dick Dowling.

The statue of Dick Dowling was the first public monument in Houston and it was created in 1905. The monument set outside the old City Hall for 35 years, but when City Hall burned it was moved to Sam Houston Park in 1940(RGA33-b2f23-05). I had never heard about City Hall burning, so that was interesting to learn. It makes you think, if City Hall had never burned would the statue still remain there today? Dowling’s statue remained at Sam Houston Park until 1957 and was then placed in storage. The Houston Chronicle explained, “When the renovation of the Noble House got under way last year, to preserve the home a historical relic, the statue of Dick Dowling was punt into storage”(Association Scrapbook). Supporters of Dowling finally made a push to take it out of storage and wanted it to be seen again by all Houstonians. So the City of Houston made plans to “put it in Hermann Park across from Hermann Hospital, but the Herman Estate said it wanted the spot for a statue of benefactor George Hermann”(Association Scrapbook). Finally, in 1958, Dick Dowling’s statue was decided to be positioned on the triangle track of land at the edge of Hermann Park where he remains to this day. One of the main questions we had as a class was why is the statue located where it is? The digital archives explained the who made those decisions but it did not shed any light on the exact reason or motivation behind the Hermann Park location. An article from the Houston Post reported, “One might suppose the statue has been relegated to oblivion in this obscure wooded spot. Actually it will be seen there by many more people-passing motorists-than saw it at the Noble House”(Association Scrapbook). This writer argued that Hermann Park is a more viewable area for the statue than Sam Houston Park. It makes you wonder about how Dowling was thought of during that time. To me it seems like his memory wasn’t on the forefront of everyones mind and very few people even knew his story. The Houston Chronicle wrote, “There probably are only a few Houstonians who have more than a hazy idea about Dick Dowling’s contribution to Texas”(Association Scrapbook). The monument of Dick Dowling was the first public monument of its kind that once set outside of City Hall and now has been placed at Memorial Park. This suggests to me a change in the memory of public memory that was once strong soon after the end of the Civil War but has since been forgotten.

Another one of the main questions we had was who were the groups involved in the creation of the Dowling statue? There seemed to be some dispute in the 1950s about who funded and created the statue. Many of the articles in the Houston Post reported that the Ancient Order of Hibernians were behind the efforts of erecting the Dowling statue. Mrs. Neta V. Taylor was adamant about giving credit where credit was due. On her personal stationary she wrote, “This shows that the United Confederate Veterans of Dick Dowling camp started this project, and there were many Irish veterans in the camp, who were instrumental in securing help from their club to help finish the monument”(Association Scrapbook). This suggests that there was some possible conflict between the Ancient Order of Hibernians and the U. C. V. Out of all this came the creation of the Dick Dowling Monument Association which was comprised by members of the Dick Dowling Camp, U. C. V. , the Ancient Order of Hibernians, and the Emmet Council, a Catholic organization”(SC1268-01-02). The Program for the Dick Dowling Monument Rededication declared these were the groups in charge of the funding and construction and claimed, “Each group represented an important facet of Dick Dowling’s life”(SC1268-01-02). I think that the struggle shown here is motivated by the pride of each of the groups, but ultimately Dowling will be remembered equally as a Confederate, an Irishman, and a Catholic.

The selected archives seemed to focus on the personal history of Dick Dowling, the brief account of The Battle of Sabine Pass, and the history of the Dowling statue. Sifting through the archives gave me some answers, but it also left a lot of our questions unanswered and created new ones. With so much real estate in Houston, why Memorial Park? Was the city just trying to appease these heritage groups and move on with day to day business? Did his ethnicity, religion, or Confederate ties negatively influence any decisions about the statue? Was Memorial Park convenient? Would the statue of remained at City Hall if it had not burned? Why does such an important war hero seem to be overlooked? This has been a helpful exercise in learning more about Dick Dowling and the statue, but more research is required to shed light on our new and old questions.

In my original blog posting about the Dowling statue, I raised the following questions:

“As the inscription was the primary place sponsoring organizations to leave their mark on the monument and set the tone of the monument, it is quite interesting that the inscription is so sparse. The questions I ask are: How were these sparse inscriptions chosen? And why was no further inscription included?”

Looking back at the inscriptions on the statue itself each of the four sides of Dick Dowling’s pedestal bear text.  The first side holds the inscription,

“This monument is erected to the memory of Dick Dowling and the Davis Guards by Dick Dowling Camp No.197 U.C.V.; and the Ancient Order of Hibernians, Divisions Nos.1.2 and 3; and the Emmett Council.”

While I was most interested in this inscription, and the careful nature in which it was planned out (the short mention of Dick Dowling, the order in which the organizations were listed, a further explanation of what each organization did for the project),  I actually found the most interesting research into the other three sides of the monument, the listing of role.  This roster, which simply aims to list all soldiers present and who fought at the Battle of Sabine Pass, served to be an interesting and telling research project.  The compilation of the roster, undertaken by Mr. D. D. Bryan the Secretary of the Dowling Monument Association during November and December of 1902, was actually a trickier task than Bryan had originally intended.  Looking at the “Dick Dowling Monument Association Records” and for timeliness at the “Transcript of Dick Dowling Monument Association Records” hosted and compiled for us by the Houston Public Library Digital Archives, I was able to track several key pieces of correspondence that I believe get at the importance and difficulty of Bryan’s task.

Starting with the earliest document regarding the roster in these documents, the correspondence of November 11, 1902 from Mrs. Geo. W. Davis to Bryan, an issue of deserters arises in the narrative (SC12680-03-099). To this point much of what we have learned about Dowling and his merry band of men, the Davis Guards, has esteemed these men from Houston who accomplished this monumental task of stopping the invading Union Navy with but 48 men and a lot of cannon fire.  Yet, when the idea that some of these men may have deserted camp prior to battle slightly mars the narrative told by Edward T. Cotham, Jr in his book Sabine Pass: The Confederacy’s Thermopylae. In the book, Cotham retells the story of Dick Dowling and the Davis Guards in a nearly Battle of the Alamo-esque way all unite to fight to “hold the fort at all hazards,” (Cotham, 121) referring to the new Fort Griffin of Sabine Pass. Yet that the Davis Guards may have had deserters takes away from this image of valiant men choosing to stay at all costs.

Yet the deserters are not mentioned specifically for the need to maintain the image of the brave men at Sabine Pass, but instead the shame of the entire unit over the desertion of a few and the reason why it was silenced, as the letter states, “Everyone felt chagrin and shame that any of the Davis Guards should desert and so silence had been observed regarding the affair.” (SC12680-03-099).  The letter goes on to state that the names could not be found at the time but that Mrs. Davis would keep looking (SC12680-03-099 to SC12680-03-105).  Still, Bryan was now aware that this list of deserters did exist, and needed to be found.

Bryan appears to have followed up his research with Mrs. Davis by contacting former Davis Guards, R.C. O’Hara and John A. Drummond.  Both men have their opinions, yet it appears that O’Hara was the more willing to both provide a list of deserters but also supplement the list of men’s names to be inscribed on the monument.  However, when asked about the deserters, O’Hara is careful to qualify, “All of the names I gave you as deserters were deliberate deserters—they were not captured—this fact is well known to all the remaining few, it should not be denied, for it is painfully true.” (SC1268-03-093)  This classification that men who deserted did so of their own free will seems to be O’Hara’s most biting crticism, that these men would so abandon their duties, have not the courage or honor expected of a Southern gentleman of the time, was more than just a reflection on the individual men’s  character, but also a painful fact for the rest of the Guards.

Whereas O’Hara believes that desertion of camp by these men “should not be denied,” John A.  Drummond offers an alternative handling of the issue of deserters, “I do not agree with those who wish to bring out the names of dead deserters to the disgrace of their descendance who are living.” (SC1268-03-097)  This respect for the families is particularly touching, yet is not echoed by O’Hara in a different letter in which he speaks of the monument as being one to honor, “My ‘brave and noble’ Comrade and Commander, and the brave and true men (except those who deserted) who were under his command.”  (SC128-03-107)  It is here that it becomes apparent that not only does O’Hara not forgive these men’s for their actions, he seems particularly hurt by their desertion when, “they went out into the night, out the fleets lying off Sabin Pass and Galveston.” (SC128-03-107)  These men were not brave and did not live up to their manhood, therefore they should not be treated lightly.

While no full rosters were given the these transcripts that I chose to examine, they are referred to as passing hands in each of the letters regarding problems in the roster (from the spelling of Clare/Care/Clair to the deserters who should be removed) that was to be placed on the monument.  While I originally thought these names would be the least cause for concern and discussion, I was utterly wrong.  I would like to find out the final decision on these men, and whether they were included in the final listing on the statue or not.  Also, the issue of desertion raises many questions in my mind as the affront this might have been on the Southern honor, virtue, and manhood that these men were supposedly living by, as evidenced by the scorn in O’Hara’s correspondence.  From this, I ask: How did the rest of the Davis Guards respond to these incidents of desertion? How did their reaction relate to Southern sensibilities, or is it something entirely different as many of these men were Irish immigrants and therefore transplants to the South? Finally, how did the desertion issue play out on the creation of Dick Dowling statue and its inscriptions? What decisions were made?

In my previous blog entry about Dick Dowling, I expressed interest in finding out the connections and the differences between the statue found in Hermann Park and the one in Sabine Pass in honor the Irish immigrant and also on the differences in motivations that each group had on erecting the monument according to their time period. Since the digital archive assembled by the Houston Public Library, revolves around the monument found in Hermann Park, naturally, I did not find much information about the second statue or why it was decided it should depict Dowling in such a different manner from the one found in Houston. The archive does provide detailed descriptions of the Dowling statue at Hermann Park.
The script from the records form the Dick Dowling Association suggests the close attention the group of people paid to the way the statue would be constructed, what materials would be used, and the aesthetics of the piece.  The statue’s pedestal was something very important to the people building the statue because it paid tribute to all the men who served with Dowling in the Davis Guards. In their records, the secretary kept a record of the updates and ideas he sculptor, Frank Teich, provided about various aspects of the sculpture, including the placement of the names on the pedestal and the manner in which they would eventually be displayed (27). In addition, they planned the statue to be six feet nine inches and have a portrait likeness of Dowling (29). The Association requested that the statue be uniformed with the Confederate Artillery Officer attire and with his left hand resting on the hilt of his sword (45). The close attention to detail is evinced in their desire to change the headgear that was originally planned because it was too large and it did not seem natural (55). The Association was trying to be as accurate as possible in regards to what the lieutenant’s attire would have looked like. While such entries in the record do not suggest a reason why such a pose was selected, they do paint a clear idea of the sort of monument they were trying to erect. This was a monument that was to honor all those who participated in the Battle and it was clearly designed to portray a sense of Confederate pride thorough the depiction of the army’s uniform.
Based on the information provided by the digital archive I cannot determine the difference in motivation between the people who constructed the statue in 1905 and the ones who decided to erect one in Sabine Pass in 1936 (Scrapbook 9).   However, the archive does have a large quantity of information on the restoration that took place in the late nineties. The information provides a response to the question of why the people of Houston decided to take it upon themselves to restore the statue and have a ceremony to rededicate it. According to the newspaper article “Etched in Stone” in the Houston Chronicle from 1997, the statue was that of a hero who fought bravely in the Battle of Sabine Pass, and who was a model citizen in the City of Houston. The article argues that a man is truly dead when he is forgotten and that a man like Dowling will never be forgotten. The article shifts focus away from his involvement with the Confederacy (although it is mentioned) and focuses more on individual accomplishments. The author exalts Dowling as a member of the firehouse and claims he was “well known for charitable work” (RGA33-b2f27-01). It seems like the people associated with the restoration of the monument were more interested in the exaltation of the person than the cause.
The information that the archive provided about the restoration of the statue triggers the question of individual motivations for the accomplishment of the goal. While it is entirely possible for the groups involved to want to exalt a local hero, they must have all had underlying reasons for supporting such a cause. Would some of the groups not associated to the Civil War or Confederacy and the Irish immigrant population have participated in the restoration if the statue was of a different person? Was the fact that Dowling is the subject significant in their involvement? Conversely, where there any people opposed to the rededication of the statue, if so, what were their reasons?

In The Public Art of Civil War Commemoration, Thomas J. Brown grappled with the question of how the public remembers its collective history. We used this book and Brown’s discussion of Civil War monuments to examine the Dick Dowling statue in Hermann Park, and ultimately in my blog post I questioned what the motives for building the statue were, given the numerous differences between the Dowling statue and other Civil War monuments. Although the Houston Public Library archives do not provide a full understanding of what motivated the statue to be built, I do think that the Dick Dowling statue provides a fascinating case study for examining how public memory changes over time. In the case of Houston’s collective memory, the statue of Dowling took on many meanings throughout the twentieth century. By examining who cared about the statue and what aspects of the statue these people highlighted, we can better understand the aspects of Texas and Houston history that Houstonians have chosen to selectively remember and forget.

In March of 1905 when the Dowling statue was first dedicated, the Houston Daily Post reported that, “the joint unveiling of the Dick Dowling monument and the celebration of St. Patrick’s day has been completed today and the veterans of the Lost Cause will form a mighty procession with the sons of Erin,” (RGA33-b2f26-35). By mentioning the veterans of the “Lost Cause,” otherwise known as Southern Secession/the Confederacy, the article makes it clear that Dowling was remembered as a Confederate hero and that the Lost Cause was something to respect and celebrate. The article went further, and noted that the statue was a “monument to the patriotism of the citizens of this city” highlighting the fact that in 1905 citizens of Houston were considered to be patriotic because of their support for the Confederacy during the war (RGA33-b2f26-35). It is important to note that the monument was dedicated on St. Patrick’s Day to showcase Dowling’s Irish heritage, but the monument at this point represented Houstonians’ equally powerful respect for both Irish Houstonians and Confederate Veterans.

By the late 1950s, it appears that credit for building the monument was going to Irish heritage groups in Houston, particularly the Hibernian Club. This enraged Daughter of the Confederacy Neta V. Taylor, and she created a scrapbook of the “Dick Dowling Monument Association” because “It has been erroneously stated that the fund was raised by private subscription and that the Hibernian Club built the monument.” Taylor’s scrapbook, she stated, “shows that the United Confederate Veterans of the Dick Dowling Camp started this project,” (SC1268-02). Unfortunately, Taylor does not state who was claiming that the Hibernian’s spearheaded the campaign, but it seems possible that perhaps in the wake of the Civil Rights movement, Houstonians wanted to highlight Dowling’s role as a prominent Irishman in Houston rather than as a Civil War veteran, and so they focused on the role that the Hibernian’s, an Irish Catholic organization, played in building the statue.

By September of 1989, however, Houston’s memory seems to have swung the other way, and the Houston Chronicle wrote an article about Dowling to commemorate the battle of Sabine Pass (RGA33-b2f25-93). This article focused almost exclusively on the battle itself, and included complimentary quotes that Jefferson Davis made about Dowling and the battle when he heard of the Confederate victory at Sabine Pass. Although the “Lost Cause” was not mentioned, this article highlights Dowling’s role as a war hero, rather than his role as a Houstonian businessman and innovator.

The 1989 commemoration of the Confederate victory at Sabine Pass may have shown that Houstonians were proud of their Confederate heritage, but 1997 a Houston Chronicle article (interestingly, by the same reporter who wrote the 1989 article) highlighted Dowling’s Irish heritage far more than his Confederate one. Indeed, in the article Dowling’s great-great-grandniece Ann Caraway Ivins lamented, “Dick Dowling has become a target just because he wore gray” and she worked to show that he was an Irishman first, who became a Confederate simply because of geography (SC1268-f1-19). Given that Ivins was a leader in pushing for Dowling’s statue to be refurbished and rededicated, two things become clear. First, Houstonians in the late 90s were far less accepting of their Confederate heritage then they had been in the past and second, Ivins worked to actively change the memory of Dowling to be one about his life and legacy as a Houstonian and an Irishman rather than as a Confederate war hero. The program of the monument’s rededication ceremony emphasizes this shift, and it is incredibly interesting to note that the ceremony’s keynote speaker was from Dowling’s hometown in Ireland rather than anyone with ties to Confederate heritage organizations. Of course, to complicate things more, the program does refer to the Civil War as “the War between the States” which implies that although Dowling’s Irish heritage was the main event, the Civil War and the cause of the Confederacy were not to be completely forgotten (SC1268-01-06). This demonstrates a conflict that many Southern states have struggled with; ultimately, the memories of the slave South and the Jim Crow South are incredibly painful and highly embarrassing to many Southerners, yet Southerners are a fiercely proud group, and to ignore their heritage seems sacrilegious. Dowling’s memory highlights that struggle.

Overall, the Dowling documents from HPL shed light on more of the issues surrounding not just the building of the Dowling monument, but the many controversies surrounding the statue throughout the twentieth century. This answers many of our old questions, but raises new ones as well. For me, what seems incredibly important to understand is what public opinion of the Dowling statue was when it was built: What did Houstonians want the statue to mean and how did they make those meanings known? Contrasting those opinions with the other opinions that I have discussed will give us a fuller picture of what parts of Houston’s history Houstonians have both forgotten and remembered.

Gary J. Kornblith seeks to go beyond the interpretations of the fundamentalists and the revisionists by using a counterfactual method and creating a thought experiment. He argues that had Henry Clay won the presidential election of 1844, there never would of been a Mexican-American War and more importantly no Civil War. He hypothesizes about the Presidency of Henry Clay and how his personal politics would have led to decisions that would have changed many things in our history. He posits that by rethinking our history by changing one event, we can imagine a much different United States of America.

Kornblith argues that if Henry Clay had been elected President he would have focused on the economy and a central bank and ignored the annexation of Texas. Keeping Texas an independent republic would have prevented the Mexican-American War and would have kept the debate of slavery out of public discourse for the most part. Ultimately, his counterfactual method of imagining a Clay presidency would have prevented a domino effect that led to the Civil War.

I understand his goal of using a unique way of rethinking history in order to comprehend the true causal factors of the Civil War, but I am not convinced by his analysis. His main arguments seem too simplistic to explain the causes of the Civil War. Based on our readings from Manning and our discussion in class, one thing I have learned is that the Civil War is very complex. Kornblith seems to ignore all the complexities by making a change in history and positing a lot of assumptions. One cannot assume that if Clay were elected President that his values and policies would not be swayed by political pressure and an ever-changing status quo. One cannot assume that Clays election would prevent the Mexican American War and Texas would remain an independent republic. Granted this a “thought experiment” so there are a lot of assumptions, but it just seems way too farfetched.

One of the major issues I have with Kornblith is his assumptions about the decisions Henry Clay would have made on different policies. With the changing ideals about the two party system, the emergence of the Republican party, and the debate of slavery, there is no way to presume that Henry Clay would remain steadfast in his policies. Kornblith somewhat undercuts himself by referencing Leron Bennett, Jr. and the “evolving views of Abraham Lincoln.” Bennett posits, “He believed in the constitutionality of slavery where it already existed, and he was prepared to tolerate its persistence there for the indefinite future.” He goes on to say, “Had it not had been for the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, Lincoln would have remained a loyal Whig who viewed southern Whigs as his political allies rather than as representatives of a slave power that endangered basic republican values”(p 99).
If Lincoln changed his views, then why would Henry Clay be immune to such a change?

Overall, I applaud Kornblith for using a dynamic method to interpret history, but realizing how complex the Civil War was, makes be believe that his analysis was too farfetched.

In his article, “Rethinking the Coming of the Civil War: A Counterfactual Exercise” Gary J. Kornblith advances his argument that without the Mexican-American War in 1846, there would have been no Civil War.  This argument “counterfactually” traces the state of Texas and the nation back to her very beginning of the Mexican-American war and proposes a different alternative, that instead of electing Polk instead the nation chose Henry Clay. Kornblith then follows out this new counterfactual history to show how President Clay’s opinions and previous actions would have been enacted as the issues that troubled the nation before the Civil War are brought before him.  Ultimately, the author proves that changing a small aspect of history may have had very different effects in the long run.

Still, I was unconvinced by Kornblith’s argument,  not only because it is not based in fact, but also because there were several key factors that Kornblith forgot to account for.  First, Kornblith blatantly ignores the possibility that his big change, Henry Clay, might change his mind about the issues and act in a manner out of character for him in order to garner support.  This ignorance of Kornblith should not be overlooked, for he is attempting to rebuild decades of valuable research around an “experiment” he ran in his head.  My second problem with the Kornblith piece was its complete neglect of the issue of slavery, as a major factor considered by the both the fundamentalists and revisionists.  I was terribly bothered by his glossing over of the topic in this article.  While the author tries to account for this by saying that as President, Clay would have avoided expansionist policies and focused less on the issues that divided the country, but instead on those issues that drew it together.

Both of these explanations for the possible lack of the war were dissatisfying to me as they were not only counterfactual, but they presented an argument that was simplistic in a time when issues very complicated as shown by our in class lecture and the very letters soldiers wrote home in (to borrow from Manning).  When all other theories revolve around a very complicated and detailed understanding of the civil war and its causes, perhaps more credence should be paid to its supporters.

In his article “Rethinking the Coming of the Civil War: A Counterfactual Exercise”, Gary J. Kornblith proposes a different view for the cause of the Civil War than those proposed by fundamentalists and revisionists. While he acknowledges that there were significant differences between the North and the South, he does not consider these as important to the start of the war. His argument revolves on the idea that the Civil War was directly influenced by the outcome and the sentiments from the Mexican American War. He creates a counterfactual scenario in which Henry Clay won the Election of 1844, and therefore changed the chances of the Mexican-American War taking place.

According to Kornblith, had Clay won the election, the war between the United States and Mexico would not have taken place because he considered “annexation and war with Mexico [as] identical” and he was not willing to take the risk of a conflict because of an addition of land. Throughout the article, Kornblith argues that the territory expansion due to the annexation of Texas and the acquisition of land from Mexico because of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo caused the issue of slavery to rise again in the minds of both Southerners and Northerners. He argues that if there had not been a war, which there would not have been if Clay had won and kept to his campaign, then the Wilmot Proviso would not have been necessary. If there had not been that expansion of territory, the issue of allowing slaves in the new lands would not have been a problem and therefore the issue of slavery would not have come to the forefront of political discussions in country. He claims that the Wilmot Proviso was a key in the “exacerbation of sectional tensions that culminated in the Civil War.”

Since Kornblith hinges his argument on the counterfactual scenario that Henry Clay won the election of 1844, he goes on to talk about other things under the imagined period.  The author argues that had Clay won the presidency, he would have kept the focus of his term on “maintain the protective tariff, promoting internal improvements, and reestablishing the national bank.” The platform he ran under and the course of his presidency would have stayed away from issues of land acquisitions and therefore the issue of slavery. He also says that divisions within the political parties “seemed to insure the protection of republicanism, of liberty and equality, which was the most fundamental goal of American in both the South and the North.” In other words, he seems to think that the differences in opinion between parties would overcome the sectional differences that fundamentalist claim were the reason for the war.

Kornblith’s argument that the territorial expansion after the Mexican-American War was essential in the prominence of the slavery issue in the time before the outbreak of war makes sense and his explanation of how the election of Henry Clay would have affected the way party politics and sectionalism are feasible. However, I have a difficult time accepting his claims because they are based on the supposition of an event. The fundamentalist and the revisionists formed their arguments on the causes of the civil based on the issues that they, as historians, had confirmed. This gives them certain validity because although the facts are often interpreted differently, they are not guesses or suppositions on past events. While all that Korblith claims could have happened, the reality is that we do not know how Clay would have reacted to the potential annexation of Texas or if he would have kept his presidency focused away from slavery.

In Gary J. Kornblith’s article, “Rethinking the Coming of the Civil War: A Counterfactual Exercise,” Kornblith argues against fundamentalist historians who claim that the major economic, social and political differences between the North and the South made the Civil War inevitable. He posits that had Henry Clay defeated James K. Polk in the presidential election of 1844 (an election that was determined by a few thousand votes in New York), the Mexican-American War would not have occurred and thus the sectional debate about whether or not to expand slavery into territories gained by the war would not have occurred. Ultimately this would have prevented hostilities over slavery from becoming intense enough to lead to the development of the Republican Party, Lincoln’s election and then Southern secession. Although it takes a substantial amount of explaining for Kornblith to make his counterfactual situation clear, his ultimate argument is that the Civil War was not, as fundamentalists argue, inevitable (at least at the time that it occurred), but rather it was caused by the Mexican-American war and the conflicts that arose from territorial gains (102).

Kornblith argues that “partisan identities counterbalanced sectional identities” during the late 1840s, and as such, the political crises of the 1850s that resulted in the formation of the Republican Party need not have happened (89). That is, he argues that without a major political crisis, the sectional differences between the North and the South were not a major threat to national unity because within the North and South major political differences existed. However, there ultimately was a crisis in the Second Party System that resulted in major political changes, and Kornblith notes that “the conflicting passions aroused by the [Wilmot] Proviso most definitely proved a threat to the national parties and to the nation itself,” (89). Thus Kornblith blames the controversy over the Wilmot Proviso, a failed piece of legislation that would have banned slavery in territories gained during the Mexican-American War, for the tensions in the US political system that led to the breakdown of the Second Party System.

Additionally, Kornblith argues that without the conflict over the Wilmot Proviso, the Fugitive Slave Law passed in the early 1850s would have been less harsh because “absent other evidence of southern aggression, most northern whites would probably have accepted a moderately strengthened fugitive slave law,” (96). Because the South became particularly jealous of the future of slavery during conflicts over the expansion of slavery, Northerners became concerned over the passion with which Southerners defended slavery and became antagonistic towards slavery and the South.

Kornblith concludes his argument and his “counterfactual thought experiment,” stating, “we can conclude that the Mexican-American was a necessary, if not sufficient, cause of the Civil War” (102). I would tend to agree with him. Ultimately, the political and social crises of the 1850s had their roots in the territories gained during the Mexican-American War. However, Kornblith goes farther and argues that absent the Civil War, “the South’s peculiar institution would almost surely have persisted beyond 1900” (102). This seems to me to be too much of a stretch; he notes that the Wilmot Proviso was the first time that issues of popular sovereignty came into the debate about slavery, and that the Compromise of 1850, which resulted from the Proviso, led to a northern belief in a southern “slave power conspiracy,” (99). Although that may be the case, it is flawed to then believe that these issues would not have occurred under other circumstances. The Mexican-American war led to a substantial increase in US territory, but any slight alteration to the fragile truce the North and the South held over the issue of slavery could have easily resulted in major conflicts that could have led to war or abolition. In that sense, Kornblith’s counterfactual scenario can help us to understand the specific events leading up to the Civil War, but to then make hypotheses about what might have happened instead of the war is to go too far.

Chandra Manning offers ample evidence as to what motivated both the Union and Confederate soldiers to fight during the Civil War. Through four miserable years of defeat,victory, death, disease, and despair, views of the war changed on both sides. The Confederate troops began the war with the mindset of fighting for a new government that would protect their personal interests, families, and the institution of slavery. As the war progressed the government began to threaten the very ideals that they sought to protect. The motivations of the Confederate soldiers began to change alongside an evolving government but ultimately they fought under the unifying principle of protecting their self-interest, family, and the institution of slavery.
As the first few shots reverberated through the Antebellum South, the confederate rank and file were motivated to fight a war “about securing a government that would do what government was supposed to do: promote white liberty, advance white families’ best interests, and protect slavery”( Manning p 29). The Union was aimed at the goal of abolishing slavery, which to the southern white man, was a direct threat his livelihood. Manning argues that, “Black slavery enabled white liberty and equality because it allowed all whites to pursue property ownership (including slaves) without outside interference, and because it made whites equal in not being slaves.”(p 33) In short, slavery was an economic resource but it also provided a balance to society and reinforced the ideal of white male superiority. If the Union was to abolish slavery then the entire social structure would be turned upside down. Among the rank and file of the Confederacy, soldiers had different self interests and different backgrounds, but the “Shared belief in the dangers of abolition powerfully united Confederate soldiers and motivated them to fight, even when they shared little else”(p 31) This united front gave the Confederates a unique sense of patriotism; a self-serving patriotism, but patriotism nonetheless. It is clear that at the beginning of the war that the rank and file of the South were fighting for a new government that would protect white liberties, white families, and the institution of slavery.
As early as 1862 the Confederate troops began to see the ‘promises’ of their government merely as nothing but words. Defeat and despair started to take a toll after losses in Missouri and Arkansas, surrendered Forts Henry and Donelson, and the loss of major cities like New Orleans, Nashville and Memphis(p 54). What was once optimism and confidence turned into an exhausted and demoralized plight. An Arkansan admitted he was “awful tired of being a soldier” and referred to the war as a “wild Goose Chase” wishing the Confederate leaders would “dry it up and let us go home”(p. 55) As things began to deteriorate the Confederate government took notice and addressed the important issue of needing more soldiers. In 1862 the Confederate Congress and Jefferson Davis worked to impose a conscription law and on April 16, 1862, the Confederate Congress enacted the first national conscription law in American history(p 55-56). It drafted white men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five and extended the enlistments of current soldiers. Manning claims that the law “enraged troops because it violated their rights, as soldiers saw them, by extending enlistments without their consent”(p 56). Along with the Conscription Act the government sought to “permit the Army to commandeer private citizens’ crops”(p 55) This is where we begin to see the change in the soldiers view and motivation. The government began to change their role and southerners viewed it as unjust and a threat to their own livelihood. The Confederate government was sought to protect the their self-interest, family and the institution of slavery and now it was threatening these very things. I believe that Virginia Sergeant John White summed up the thoughts of all Confederate troops when he said, “I love my country but I love my family better”(p 59). I think that he perfectly alludes to the steadfast ideal that of Southerners that at the end of the day self interest and family are the most important things in life. Although most Confederate troops were dissatisfied and at time outraged at their government, they clung to the ideal of defending slavery and keeping Union ideals out of their life.
It is clear that the confederate troops’ views and motivations changed throughout the war and it was facilitated by changes in their Government’s actions. Regardless of how meager the situation seemed, they maintained the unifying principle of protecting self-interest, family and the institution of slavery.

As I read What This Cruel War was Over, my mind traveled back to my fourth grade social studies class and our preparation for Virginia standardized tests, the SOLs. One of the practice exams for the Virginia/US history test featured part of a letter from a Confederate soldier to his family. While I do not remember what the letter said, the question asked what we could infer from the letter, and the answer was “That the Confederates were fighting bravely for their homes and families.” This question struck my teacher as both inaccurate and offensive—she was appalled that the state standardized tests would have a question about the Civil War without mentioning slavery. Yet as Manning showed in her book the question was only partially inaccurate. Yes, the question should have mentioned slavery’s role in the Civil War, but for Confederate soldiers it would have been impossible to think about fighting a war to preserve slavery without thinking about the preservation of their homes and families. Indeed, even as Union soldiers’ motivations for fighting the Civil War changed and developed, Confederate soldiers remained steadfast in their belief that the war was about protecting their families by defending the institution of slavery.

When the Civil War began in 1861, most southern soldiers joined the Confederate army with the goal of “securing a government that would do what government was supposed to do: promote white liberty, advance white families’ best interests, and protect slavery” (Kindle Edition, Locations 566-79). Additionally, Confederates “warned that abolition would obliterate the rights and duties of white manhood, chief among them the protection of white women’s virtue” (Kindle, Locations 689-702). Confederates thus fought to protect their families and their way of life. Manning argues that all of these arguments came back to slavery, and although she is correct in this assertion, she places too much emphasis on slavery. She notes “it is patronizing and insulting to confederate soldiers to pretend that they did not understand the war as a battle for slavery when they so plainly described it as exactly that” (Kindle, 620-32). Yet I would argue that it is patronizing for her to make the jump from quotes where Confederate soldiers “could rally to the ‘watch word of ‘Our Mothers, our wives, our daughters, our sisters, Our God and our country’” to analysis that stated “most of all, losing to the Union was unthinkable…because it would mean abolition” (Kindle, 1231-45). Slavery was important and slavery was tied to Southerner’s definition of family, but quotes like this one focus more on the importance of protecting white womanhood from the Union than on protecting slavery. These thoughts may even have been so connected that protection from the Union meant protection from abolition, but it is overly simplistic to think that the family always meant slavery—sometimes the family meant that white Southerners were appalled that their wives were starving, or had been forced to keep their opinions to themselves thanks to Butler’s Women Order.

By the end of the war Confederate soldiers’ motivations to stop fighting were nearly identical for their reasons to begin fighting. Manning notes that to Confederates, “Most obviously, the belief that an independent Confederacy would do a better job of furthering the interests of white southern families looked tragically ridiculous by the fourth year of the war, when men…regularly received letters from hungry families” (Kindle, 3913-26). Confederates were willing to surrender (and for many soldiers, desert) because if their families were suffering, then it was time to stop fighting and go back home to protect them. They left home to protect their families, and returned home to do the same. Throughout the war, their families were a constant motivation, and of course, protecting them from the end of slavery was part of that motivation.

However, it is important to note that Southerners did not know a world without slavery: it was inextricably linked to their way of life. Although this proves Manning’s point that slavery was key to the war, she focuses so much on slavery that attributes southern passion for family as passion for slavery. At times, they were the same passion (and sometimes the passion for slavery was stronger), but at times, the family was the motivator for Southerners to fight, and simply because they had never known the family without slavery does not mean that they only fought for the family because of slavery.